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Abstract
We explore the determinants of the international pattern of home ownership using the Luxembourg Income
Study (LIS), a collection of microeconomic data on fourteen OECD countries. In most, the cross-section is
repeated over time and includes several demographic variables carefully matched between the different surveys.
This allows us to construct a truly unique international dataset, merging data on more than 400,000 households
with aggregate panel data on mortgage loans and down payment ratios. After controlling for demographic
characteristics, country effects, cohort effects and calendar time effects, we find strong evidence that the
availability of mortgage finance – as measured by outstanding mortgage loans and down payment ratios - affects
the age-profile of home ownership, especially at the young end. The results have important implications for the
debate on the relation between saving and growth.
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The timing of home purchase varies significantly by country. In Australia, Canada, the
United States and the United Kingdom, for instance, homes are purchased early in life and the
age-profile rises sharply already at young ages. In other countries (such as Austria, Italy and
Spain) homes are purchased later on and the average age at first purchase is in the late thirties
or forties. This paper represents the first systematic attempt to account for these differences.
There are a variety of reasons why the age profile of home ownership may differ across
countries, such as household composition, house prices and tax incentives. We try to control
as much as possible for these factors but focus primarily on the possible role of the
availability of finance and of credit market imperfections.
Up to now, international comparisons of housing markets have relied on simulation studies
or aggregate data. Hayashi, Ito and Slemrod (1988) use simulations to show that differences
in home mortgage down payment ratios explain some of the difference in saving rates
estimated in the United States and in Japan, while the different tax treatment of home
ownership plays only a minor role. MacLennan et al. (1999) give a set of useful statistics on
European housing markets and speculate that asymmetries in market structure, institutions
and tax policies not only affect the degree of competition, but can also have far-reaching
implications for macroeconomic policy.
The main contribution of this paper is its exploitation of a large international dataset to
study the determinants of housing tenure. The sample of households is a collection of 39
individual national surveys spanning almost 30 years and 14 countries, with a total of over
400,000 observations. Home ownership and age are observed in all of them, along with other
appropriately matched demographic variables. Our dataset is then merged with country panel
data on indicators of access to housing finance markets (the ratio of mortgage lending to GDP
and the down payment ratio). Given the richness of the dataset, we can estimate the age
profile of home ownership controlling for individual country effects, time (or cohort) effects,
demographic variables, proxies for permanent income and mortgage market indicators.
1
Understanding the reasons for the difference in the age profile of home ownership has
important policy implications. If the main reasons why the profiles differ can be traced to
supply-side factors - e.g., mortgage market imperfections - then the integration of European
credit markets will induce dramatic changes in each country’s housing and mortgage markets
and in the age pattern of home ownership. If instead the main source of international
differences is demand-side effects (such as household formation and composition), or to
intergenerational networks operating on a different scale across countries, then the impact of
financial markets integration will be far less powerful.
In Section 2 we review various reasons why the age profile of home ownership may vary
across countries. Above all we deal with some institutional features of housing finance
1  Deaton (1999) has recently pointed out the importance of merging household surveys from different
countries in order to test formally for the impact of institutional differences. This paper represents an attempt
to work in this direction.8
markets. We uncover substantial international differences in the size of the mortgage market
and in down payment ratios. In speculating as to their sources, we single out judicial
efficiency, asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders, and regulation. Section 3
presents the microeconomic data set and the characteristics of the sample. In the empirical
analysis we focus on basic demographic variables (age, marital status, household
composition, education); we are therefore confident that the various surveys are broadly
comparable, across years as well as across countries. The heart of the paper is Section 4,
which presents our econometric estimates and the predicted age profile of home ownership for
various levels of mortgage lending/GDP ratios and down payment ratios. We find that access
to financial markets increases the probability of becoming home owner at young ages, a result
consistent with theoretical models of intertemporal choice, housing and credit constraints.
Section 5 summarizes the evidence and sets out the main implications for the integration of
European financial markets and the ongoing debate on the link between saving and growth.
2. International differences in housing finance markets
Our point of departure is the significant international differences in levels of home
ownership and the timing of purchases. Figure 1 displays the age profile of home ownership
in the fourteen countries surveyed: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France,
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the
United States. Each profile is based on household-level data and obtained by the fitted values
of a probit regression of home ownership on a third-order age polynomial.
2 Individual country
curves are differently shaped. In Italy and Austria, for instance, the proportion of owner-
occupation rises slowly with age and peaks just before retirement. This contrasts sharply with
the pattern in countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia,
where peaks are ten or fifteen years earlier.
There are several possible explanations for the different patterns of home purchase shown
in Figure 1. A first set of factors are genuine differences in the demographic composition of
the population and in permanent income. For many households, the timing of household
formation and the arrival of children coincide with plans to buy a house. Moreover, household
resources are certainly correlated with the home purchase decision.
3 A second set of
explanations discussed in Section 3 centers on sample selection issues.
What we are most interested in, however, is the interaction between the timing of home
purchase and market imperfections that limit mortgage lending. Among the many possible
2  Details about data definitions and consistency across countries are postponed to Section 3.
3 One should also consider the possibility that household formation depends on the availability of housing
and the potential endogeneity of several demographic variables with respect to the home purchase decision. For
instance, the average age at marriage might be higher when couples cannot afford to buy a house. Although they
are potentially important, we disregard these effects and consider demographic variables as exogenous.9
indicators of mortgage market imperfections, the variables on which we focus are two related
indicators of the availability of mortgage finance: first, simply the size of the mortgage
market, as measured by the aggregate ratio of outstanding mortgage lending to GDP; second,
the required down payment, which forces even impatient consumers to curb consumption
early in life in order to accumulate enough assets to make the down payment (Artle and
Varaya, 1978). This constraint is binding only if households have a preference for owning, as
opposed to renting. In the theoretical literature, this is usually explained by assuming that a
house yields higher utility when owned than when rented.
4 Thus, under very standard and
reasonable assumptions, the timing of home purchase depends directly on the level of the
down payment ratio: the lower the ratio, the earlier the purchase.
The main hypothesis that we test is whether, controlling for demographic factors, proxies
for permanent income and national institutional features, the availability of credit and
indicators of mortgage market imperfections (such as down payment constraints) affect the
timing of home purchase.
Table 1 reports several indicators of housing finance markets for the 14 countries of our
sample: the 1986-96 average of the ratio of outstanding mortgage loans to GDP, the spread
between the mortgage rate and a long-term reference rate, the typical mortgage maturity, and
the minimum down payment ratio (by decade). The down payment ratio refers to
conventional home-purchase loans to first-time buyers.
5 In constructing the down payment
series we have updated the dataset of Jappelli and Pagano (1994) to the 1990s using data from
McLennan, Muellbauer and Stephens (1999), Lea and Diamond (1992), and Lea, Welter and
Dubel (1997). Since virtually no country has readily available yearly data on down payments,
the implicit assumption is that the variable changes slowly over time. The Appendix gives
more detail on the construction and definition of this variable.
Table 1 shows that mortgage markets differ widely from country to country. In Canada, the
United States, the United Kingdom, Sweden and Finland, it is well developed, the down
payment is relatively low, and mortgage maturity normally exceeds 20 years. In some other
countries (Belgium, Italy, Germany and Spain) the market is relatively thin and the down
payment high.
Cross-country variability in the volume of mortgage lending can be traced to supply factors
(interest rate spreads and rationing) or demand factors (earnings profiles, age structure of the
population, ownership preference, tax incentives for owning and debt, intergenerational
4  This can be justified in three ways: (1) owning eliminates the principal-agent relationship, i.e. the owner can
alter the house as desired and is not subject to the risk of eviction or rent increases; (2) tax incentives for
owning; (3) there may be no alternative to owning because of imperfections and regulations in the rental
market.
5  In some countries there is no statutory minimum down payment ratio and payment arrangements are at the
discretion of the individual lender. In that case we assume that the minimum down payment ratio equals the
minimum observed average down payment ratio in the decade.10
transfers). In the empirical analysis, we control for demand factors; accordingly we focus here
on the supply side.
The spread between borrowing and lending rates is an important indicator of mortgage
market imperfections. In itself, a spread is consistent with equilibrium models of the mortgage
market (in which it depends on transaction costs and is negatively correlated with the supply
of loans) or with asymmetric information models (in which there is no necessary relation).
Among our 14 sample countries (Table 1) the differences in 1986-96 spreads are negligible,
while the cross-country variation in mortgage lending is huge. The spread varies from –2.3
percentage points in Spain (a country with comparatively mortgage debt) to about 1.5 points
in Italy and Austria (also with low levels of debt) and the United States (at the other end of the
spectrum). In short, there is simply no correlation between the spread and the size of the
mortgage market lending, which suggests that indicators of credit rationing may be more
relevant than interest spreads.
The down payment ratio is a direct indicator of credit rationing; it exhibits considerable
variability, both cross-country and over time. Table 1 shows that in the last three decades
rationing has been most pervasive in Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and
Spain, and is directly reflected in the relatively small size of these countries’ mortgage
markets. The table also shows that in most cases the down payment has declined, thanks to
the easing of regulation and increased competition between intermediaries. But this does not
hold for every country. In Sweden and the United States, the average down payment in the
nineties was higher than in the eighties.
Even though it seems self-evident to think that high down payment ratios will affect the
timing of home buying, this may not always be the case. Intergenerational transfers could ease
the down payment constraint. There are two ways in which such transfers interact with the
desire to acquire a home. If transfers help households to meet the down payment, the
“effective” and binding amount might be lower than reported in Table 1, because family
networks can circumvent mortgage market imperfections.
6 Alternatively, if young households
expect to receive a house as a bequest, they may choose to rent and wait to receive the
bequest. This strategy avoids saving to meet the down payment.
7 Thus, the effect of the down
payment on the timing of purchase is not a priori obvious, making the empirical analysis more
interesting and informative.
Although the down payment constraint can be regarded as an indicator of credit rationing,
it is also a mortgage contract term that is chosen by lenders and therefore it itself depends on
incentives to repay debt obligations and institutional design. Thus one may wonder why down
payment requirements differ so greatly. Jappelli and Pagano (1994) focus on three main
explanations: (1) regulation of minimum down payment requirements, (2) asymmetric
6  While a network of informal markets may overcome housing finance imperfections, to be effective transfers
have to be well timed. They must come when they are needed, i.e. when credit constraints are binding.
Bequests are very unlikely to serve this purpose: what is needed is inter vivos gifts or loans.
7  Engelhardt (1994) and Guiso and Jappelli (1998) analyze the importance of this channel and find that inter
vivos transfers reduce saving time in both the United States and Italy. From an economic point of view,
however, the magnitude of this effect is not large.11
information between borrowers and lenders, and (3) the cost of enforcing contracts and the
willingness to repay.
The most obvious impact on lenders’ behavior comes from regulation, which often simply
imposes minimum down payment ratios for mortgage loans. These vary considerably between
countries: until the eighties they were as high as 50 percent in Italy and 40 percent in Spain,
and as low as 25 percent in Canada and 20 percent in France.
The extent of asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders can also affect
mortgage market performance. In the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom loan
applications are processed rapidly because specialized credit reference agencies report the
credit histories of all applicants and creditors share information. In other countries, such as
Finland, France, Italy, Belgium and Spain, these agencies are in their infancy or exchange
limited data (mainly on defaults or arrears), so the extent of asymmetric information is
potentially greater (Jappelli and Pagano, 1999). In the presence of severe information
problems, lenders protect themselves with larger down payment ratios.
The recent law and finance literature emphasises the importance of differences in the legal
system and judicial efficiency for the performance of credit markets (La Porta et al., 1997 and
1998). This literature suggests that the cost of enforcing contracts, the cost of disposing of
collateral and the willingness to repay financial obligations can affect collateral requirements
set by lenders and hence the down payment ratio.
Table 2 evaluates the efficiency of the judicial system and the willingness to repay debt
obligations in the different countries. The indicators of “judicial efficiency” and “rule of law”
capture different degrees of willingness to repay. Though they are fairly crude, they could be
taken as a proxy for moral hazard problems for lenders. We also focus on proxies for
enforcement costs in mortgage markets, i.e. the average length of housing mortgage
foreclosure proceedings and legal expenses as a percentage of the price of the mortgaged
house. Unfortunately, these indicators are available only for the 1980s and are averaged over
time.
On the basis of these indicators, Belgium, Germany, Italy and Spain feature less efficient
judicial systems and lengthier duration of mortgage foreclosure.
8 The Italian case in particular
stands out. Due to the slowness of its judicial process, debt collection and repossession can be
very costly and time-consuming: it takes an average of 4 years to repossess a house in case of
mortgage foreclosure and legal expenses can be as high as 20 percent of the price. At the
other extreme, the Netherlands, Canada, and the United States feature high judicial efficiency
and a quick mortgage foreclosure process.
Figure 2 plots the ratio of mortgage lending to GDP against two indicators reported in
Table 2 (judicial efficiency and duration of foreclosure). The size of the mortgage market
correlates positively with judicial efficiency and negatively with duration: that is, the
8  The variables in Table 2 are closely inter-related. For instance, legal expenses and foreclosure duration are
positively correlated. Judicial efficiency correlates negatively with duration. Rule of law correlates positively
with judicial efficiency and negatively with duration.12
countries with better judicial systems are also those that feature the deepest mortgage markets.
Figure 3 suggest that judicial efficiency is negatively and duration positively correlated with
down payment ratios. This descriptive evidence suggests that enforcement problems may be
at the roots of the international differences in mortgage lending and in down payment ratios.
Here we focus primarily on international differences in the size of the mortgage market and
in down payment ratios, but one might want to consider several other factors. Almost
everywhere there is significant government involvement in mortgage lending, either directly
or through tax incentives (EC Mortgage Federation, 1990; MecLennan et al., 1999). Subsidies
for home ownership and direct government intervention (such as social housing programs) are
also important, as are the tax treatment of property and the regulation of rental markets.
Finally, macroeconomic factors and the business cycle can also have impact. We cannot
control explicitly for all these variables, but in our econometric model we consider them
assuming that they are captured by country fixed effects and calendar time effects.
3. The international data set
The Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) is a research project by CEPS-INSTEAD to enhance
international comparability among twenty-five different household surveys. The main focus is
on income and taxation, and to date the empirical literature has used LIS data mainly for
international comparison of income inequality and poverty. Each survey contains information
on demographic characteristics of the household and home ownership. Wealth and
consumption data are generally lacking or difficult to compare internationally. Since we use
only the basic demographic variables we can refer mostly to the original surveys without need
of further corrections or imputations.
We concentrate on a group of fourteen relatively homogeneous countries excluding, for
instance, such transition economies as Poland and Russia, which feature housing subsidies
and mortgage markets that are fundamentally different from those of the market economies.
Other countries are excluded for lack of data on significant demographic variables, home
ownership, or down payment ratios.
The sample period spans three decades overall. In all the countries selected except
Luxembourg and Austria the cross-section is repeated over time, providing an opportunity to
exploit the time-variability of home ownership and differences between households and
countries. The earliest surveys are for the United States (the 1974 CENSUS) and Canada (the
1975 Survey of Consumer Finances), the latest ones for Italy (the 1995 Survey of Household
Income and Wealth), Sweden (the 1995 Income Distribution Survey) and the United Kingdom
(the 1995 Family Expenditure Survey). In some cases the survey design has changed (as in
Germany, before and after re-unification). In the Netherlands we rely on two different surveys
(the 1983 and 1987 Supplementary Enquiry on the Use of Public Services and the 1991 and
1994 Socio-Economic Panel).
In short, the LIS survey allows us to construct a unique international dataset for 400,000
households. Table 3 gives the sources and the total number of observations for each country.
The number of surveys varies (only one in Luxembourg and Austria and four in the United
States, Australia and the Netherlands). There is also considerable variability in the number of13
observations. The four Canadian surveys, for instance, cover a total of 75,000 households, and
the four Australian surveys almost 50,000 households. In most cases, however, the number of
observations per country is between 15,000 and 30,000 (4 to 8 percent of the total sample).
We carefully matched variables in all the selected surveys to create an unbalanced,
repeated cross-sectional dataset. The demographic variables that we were able to match are
ownership status (owner or renter), household size, number of earners, a dummy for couples,
age, gender and educational level of the household head. The matching process is detailed in
the Appendix. The main problem was to recode education. In the original surveys the
education variable sometimes appears as years of education, in other cases as the highest
degree attained, in others still as age at completion of education. We decided to recode into
three levels (low, middle and high), based on the 7 categories defined by the International
Standard Classification of Education (ISCED, 1997). Full details are given in the Appendix.
Any study that uses microeconomic data must have a definition of the household and of the
head of household. These problems are more difficult when one uses repeated cross-sectional
data and especially data in different countries. The definition that we use is mainly taken from
the original surveys, where the determination of the head is sometimes left to the respondent,
but is usually income-based. However, whenever in the original surveys the head is a female
and the spouse is a male, we define the head to be the male.
9 During the years spanned by our
sample (1974-95), household composition changed considerably in all countries examined.
Because of the increase in the number of single persons and the decline in fertility, all
countries in Table 4 (except Belgium) experienced a decline in the average number of
household members.
Table 5 reports the proportion of household heads in six age brackets in each country
(country surveys are aggregated over time). The age distribution of heads is concave in all
countries, with cells generally containing between 10 and 20 percent of the national sample,
with two important exceptions. In Italy and Spain the incidence of young heads is much lower
(4.16 and 5.39 percent, respectively). This difference does not only reflect differences in the
age structure of the population. Rather Italians and Spaniards young adults tend to live with
their parents well beyond the age of 25, owing to higher unemployment and more difficult
access to independent living arrangements (either rent or purchase). Furthermore, since
independent young households in these two countries are, on average, richer sample selection
may be correlated with wealth and hence with home ownership.
10 A related problem is the
use, in the empirical analysis, of the age of the head to describe the behavior of the household.
In nuclear households this is not a bad assumption, but when co-residence of relatively mature
young adults with their parents is widespread, as in Italy and Spain, the age of the
“household” is not a well-defined concept.
The proportion of homeowners in each age bracket is reported in Table 6, which
reproduces the patterns described in Figure 1 and signals substantial differences in the level
and timing of home ownership across countries. As far as the level is concerned, Austria,
9  Details are given in the Appendix.
10  For this reason, we dropped the households with head younger than 25 years.14
France, Germany and the Netherlands feature relatively low ownership rates. For timing, in
Finland and in the United Kingdom ownership is already widespread in the first age bracket.
In these two countries and in Australia, Canada, Sweden and the United States the bulk of
home purchases are made in the head’s early or mid-30s. In other countries (such as Austria
and Germany) there is a gradual increase. In Spain the proportion of homeowners in the
youngest age bracket is only apparently high, because the cell size is so small. In Finland and
Sweden housing policies favor cooperative housing which we consider ownership. The profile
is increasing up to age 40 in both countries, with a marked decline in Sweden after retirement
age. Note also the wide difference between Belgium and the Netherlands. In Belgium home
ownership is quite common even in old age, while in the Netherlands the elderly sell their
homes after retirement and rely mainly on social renting.
The final step is to merge the microeconomic dataset with panel data on the mortgage-GDP
ratio and on down payments.
11 Annual data on the mortgage-GDP ratio are readily available,
but down payments are decade averages, so if for a particular country the survey is repeated in
a given decade, we assign different values for mortgage lending, but the same value for the
down payment ratio. That is, mortgage lending varies with each survey and country, while the
down payment ratio varies by country and decade. But both are constant for all households
surveyed in a particular year and country. From the point of view of individual households,
the aggregate mortgage-GDP ratio and the average down payment ratio are truly exogenous
variables. However, as we shall see, any inferences must take into account the special nature
of our sample.
4. Empirical results
The main advantage of our approach over previous comparative studies of housing markets
is that we can test the hypothesis that access to credit affects home ownership using
microeconomic data and a truly exogenous proxy for imperfections.
The econometric model posits that the probability of buying a house for household i in
country c and year t is a function of a third-order polynomial in age common to all countries,
a set of demographic variables  t c i X , ,  (education, household composition, number of earners,
gender of household head, marital status), and indicators of access to mortgage finance  t c D , :
( ) t c t c i t c t c t c i t c i t c i age D D X age f H m g d d b a + + ´ + + + + = = , , , 2 , 1 , , , , , , ) ( ) 1 Pr( (1)
11 The average home ownership rate does not correlate with the size of the mortgage market, or with other
indicators of housing finance. Thus, thin mortgage markets cannot be attributed to a low percentage of
owner-occupation. This implies that households acquire homes even where the down payment is high,
borrowing very little or not at all. We take this as indirect evidence that a high down payment affects the
timing of home purchase, but does not discourage people from becoming home owners. Econometric
evidence for this hypothesis is produced in Section 4.15
The main hypothesis is that mortgage market imperfections affect the home ownership
profile. We expect this effect to be greatest for the young, who lack collateral and must save
up before they can buy. We thus interact the mortgage-GDP ratio and the down payment ratio
(the D variables) with age.
The regression includes a full set of country effects  c g  (c=1,…C-1), and a full set of
calendar time effects  t m  (t=1,…T-1). Time effects capture aggregate macroeconomic shocks,
while country effects control for relevant institutional differences (such as taxation, access to
social housing and rent controls). Equation (1) brings out that variables that are constant
between countries or periods are not identified, because they are collinear with the fixed
effects  c g  and  t m . The reason why we can identify the effect of the mortgage-GDP ratio and
of the down payment ratio is that they vary both across countries and over time.
The regression is estimated with grouped data, where each cell consists of an
age/year/country observation. Demographic variables are constructed accordingly, so that for
instance the variable “male” is the proportion of male-headed households at age i in year t and
country c. In our final sample we have 1,917 cells on 14 countries in 17 different years. Since
the sample is a collection of surveys from different countries, we need to take into account
that observations might be positively correlated within each survey. This is an application of
neighborhood effects induced by survey designs that are based on clusters of observations.
The positive correlation between observations might inflate the standard errors (Deaton, 1997,
p. 73-78). We therefore use a robust variance-covariance matrix assuming that observations
between the different samples are independent, but not necessarily within each individual
survey.
12
While there is no strong theoretical justification for considering cohort effects in home
ownership, they are potentially important because they can account for increases in
productivity and resources across generations, hence for the common rise in ownership rates.
As the separate effect of age, time and cohort cannot be estimated independently, however, in
an alternative specification we drop the calendar time dummies and introduce a cohort effect
b q  as a separate regressor, where year of birth b=t-age:
( ) b c t c i t c t c t c i t c i t c i age D D X age f H q g d d b a + + ´ + + + + = = , , , 2 , 1 , , , , , , ) ( ) 1 Pr( (2)
In the empirical specification the cohort effect  b q  is tightly parameterized, but other
functional forms (for instance, cohort dummies or higher order polynomials in year of birth)
do not affect the results.
12  Detailed information on clustering and stratification in single surveys is not available. We therefore proceed
under the assumption that each of the 39 surveys is drawn randomly, and that individual errors are
uncorrelated between different surveys and years. However, we control for country and calendar time fixed
effects, thus allowing the error term to vary within each country and year.16
The regression coefficients are reported in Table 7. The first column refers to the
specification in equation (1) with year effects and uses the ratio of outstanding mortgage
lending to GDP as an indicator of the availability of finance. Household size and the dummy
for couples are positive and statistically different from zero. The largest impact is for a couple
(an increase of 23 percentage points in the probability). The dummy for households with more
than two income recipients is negative, while the coefficients of education and of male
household heads are not statistically different from zero. Each of the three age coefficients is
statistically different from zero at the 1 percent level.
The coefficient of the mortgage-GDP ratio is positive, statistically different from zero at
the 1 percent level, and large in absolute value. The coefficient of the interaction term has an
opposite sign, indicating that the derivative of the probability of owning with respect to the
mortgage-GDP ratio is large and positive at young ages and falls with age.
The estimates in Table 7 do not consider that the various cells are estimated with different
numbers of observations.
13 The error term is therefore heteroskedastic, and a more appropriate
procedure might be weighted least squares using as weights 
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n is the number of observations and h the probability of ownership in each cell. Such a
minimum chi-square estimator produces results that are qualitatively quite similar to those in
Table 7. The coefficient of the mortgage-GDP ratio is 0.75 with a t-statistic of 3.1 and that of
the interaction term is -0.015 with a t-statistic of -4.9.
Since the effect of age is non-linear, it is easier to interpret if we plot the predicted age
profile (Figure 4). The figure also shows most clearly the effect of mortgage finance
availability on the probability of home ownership. The profile is evaluated for three different
values of the mortgage-GDP ratio (5, 20 and 50 percent). The size of the credit market tilts the
profile. For the youngest age brackets, home ownership is some 20 percentage points higher
in countries with a 50 percent mortgage-GDP ratio (close to the values of Sweden and the
United States in the nineties) than those where the ratio is 5 percent (Italy in the seventies).
The lines intersect at age 55, and then the pattern reverses. This result dovetails perfectly with
a model in which credit market imperfections affect the timing of home acquisition.
In the second specification we add year of birth and drop the calendar time dummies, as in
equation (2) (results are given in Table 7, column 2). The cohort effect is positive, with
ownership increasing by 0.4 percentage points for each year of birth, regardless of country.
Still, the two coefficients of the mortgage-GDP ratio are virtually unchanged, and the impact
of mortgage availability is largest in the youngest age group.
The other two regressions of Table 7 replace the mortgage-GDP ratio with the down
payment ratio. The sign and significance of the demographic variables do not change
appreciably. The effect of the down payment is as expected and is plotted in Figure 5.
Lowering it from 50 percent (as in Italy in the seventies) to 20 percent (as in France) or to 5
13  The average number of observations in each cell is 192, but 5 percent of the cells are based on less than 50
observations (the minimum is 11) and 5 percent on more than 500 observations (the maximum is 1849).17
percent (as in the United Kingdom in the nineties) increases the predicted probability by 15 or
20 percentage points, respectively. Also according to this specification, the down payment
effect reverses its sign at older ages.
Given the potential endogeneity of headship in Italy and Spain, we repeat the estimations
excluding these two countries from the analysis. In both specifications the effect of the
demographic variables is essentially unaffected and the coefficients of implied effect of the
mortgage-GDP ratio and of the down payment ratio on the probability of purchase and on the
age-profile of ownership are unchanged.
14
Before concluding, an important caveat is in order. As we repeatedly stress, our regressions
do not consider explicitly some important determinants of home ownership. Such factors as
housing policies (tax incentives for ownership, subsidies, rent control and social housing
programs), labor market effects (migration and other determinants of the demand for housing)
and genuine differences in owning/renting preferences certainly affect the housing market and
the timing of home purchase. In our specification, the effects of these omitted variables are
captured by fixed country effects. These fixed effects are no more than an admission of
ignorance, because the variables that affect the demand for housing are difficult to measure
and to compare across countries. In order to identify their effects, one would need time-
varying regressors at the country level.
 As an exploratory and descriptive analysis, we have considered the correlation coefficients
of the estimated fixed effects with the proxies for judicial enforcement reported in Table 2.
Our focus in this procedure is narrow. We wished to check whether the mortgage-GDP ratio
and the down payment ratio are sufficient indicators for the effect of mortgage market
imperfections, or whether we are missing important dimensions through which international
differences in enforcement affect mortgage markets and hence home ownership. It turns out
that in each of the specifications reported in Table 7 the correlation coefficients between the
estimated country effects and the proxies for enforcement in Table 2 are not statistically
different from zero. We take this descriptive evidence to indicate that the size of the mortgage
market and the down payment ratio are the best suited statistic most likely to capture
international differences in institutional and economic constraints in mortgage markets.
15
14  As a sensitivity check, we also exclude Australia and Finland from the sample. In these two countries age is
reported in large bands and the age profile of home ownership is less reliable. The results are almost
identical.
15  Rule of law indicators are available also on a yearly basis from 1982 to 1995. However, for developed
countries the time-variability of this variable is quite limited (and for some of the countries rule of law is
actually a constant). Since rule of law is collinear with the fixed effects, if it is introduced as a separate
regressor the estimated coefficient comes with a large standard error.18
4. Conclusions
We have explored the determinants of home ownership using an international dataset on
over 400,000 households in 14 countries. The dataset also includes selected demographic
variables, carefully matched between the different surveys. The econometric estimates are
consistent with the hypothesis that mortgage market imperfections affect the age profile of
home ownership, obliging young households to save and postpone home purchase until later
in life. We find that in countries with deep mortgage markets the home ownership profile is
much more tilted towards the young; and that lowering the down payment ratio by 30
percentage points (say, from 50 to 20 percent) would increase home ownership for young
families by about 15 percentage points. This effect is attenuated and then reversed at older
ages. These econometric results control for fixed country effects and calendar time effects and
are robust with respect to the particular sample used.
The study has implications for housing markets in Europe. Many changes in mortgage
rules have been made in the past decade: down payments have been lowered in many
countries, restrictions on maturities abolished, legal costs reduced and second mortgages
introduced. Credit reference agencies on households are now operating on a large scale. These
changes have undoubtedly sharpened competition between lenders; credit terms for
prospective home buyers will improve accordingly. The econometric estimates suggest that
convergence of European mortgage markets will shift the ownership profile towards younger
cohorts and at least temporarily prompt higher demand for home mortgages.
Our findings also have far-reaching implications for the literature on saving. Given a down
payment constraint, the young must save before they can purchase a home. Deaton (1999)
points out that this raises the aggregate wealth-income ratio and reinforces the link between
saving and growth in finite-horizon models. The econometric estimates show that the down
payment ratio is an important determinant of the timing of home purchase. Insofar as the
distortion in the age-profile of home ownership translates into higher saving by the young,
credit market imperfections become an explanatory factor for international differences in the
aggregate saving rate.
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Data Appendix
1. The household head
The definition of head of household is the same as in the original surveys with one important
exception. If the head is a female and the spouse is a male, we define the household head to be the
male. The specific definition of head is reported below.
Australia: The head is the primary income unit of the family. If the income unit is a couple, the head is
the husband.
Austria: The respondent designates the head of the household.
Belgium: The head is the male in the case of married or unmarried couples, either male or female in
the case of a single adult living with children. In all other cases the respondent designates the head of
household
Canada: The head of household is always the head of the primary economic family.
Finland: The head of the household is the person with the highest income.
France: A definition of household head is not provided. However, the interviewer selects the reference
person and this person provides information about other household members.
Germany: The head is the person with the best knowledge of household living conditions.
Italy: The survey unit head is usually the husband or father. If he is abroad or lives outside the
household the head is the person who is economically responsible for the family.
Luxembourg: The survey unit head is the male in the case of couples. Otherwise, it is the owner of the
housing unit.
Netherlands: The respondent designates the head (he or she must be over 18 years old). Otherwise, the
interviewer suggests the rent payer, the homeowner, the person with the highest income, or the eldest
person.
Spain: The head of household is the person who contributes financially to the household on a regular
basis and takes care of paying the bills, etc.
Sweden: The head of the family is the person with the highest earnings, including pensions. If a person
is full-time self-employed he/she will be the head, irrespective of income level.
United Kingdom: The survey unit head is the head of household. The head of household must be a
member of that household. He or she is the person (or spouse), who (1) owns the household
accommodation, or (2) is legally responsible for the rent of the accommodation, or (3) has the
household accommodation as an emolument or perquisite, or (4) has the household accommodation by
virtue of some relationship to the owner who is not a member of the household. When two members of
different gender have equal claim, the male is taken as head of household; when of the same gender,
the male.
United States: A family is defined as a group of two persons or more (one of whom is the householder
or head) residing together and related by birth, marriage, or adoption.21
2. Variables used in the estimation
AGE OF THE HOUSEHOLD HEAD. In Australia and Finland the surveys report selected age categories. In
these cases, the age variable is recoded as the midpoint of the interval.
GENDER OF THE HOUSEHOLD HEAD. The variable is 1 for male head, 0 for females.
NUMBER OF CHILDREN UNDER AGE 18 This variable excludes the head and the spouse if they are under
18 and includes adopted and foster children and other young relatives.
NUMBER OF ADULTS is defined as the difference between the number of persons in the household and
the number of children under age 18.
NUMBER OF EARNERS As a general rule, this variable is defined as the number of individuals with
positive wages, salaries or income from self-employment.
EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF THE HEAD The level of detail of this variable varies from survey to survey. In
some cases the respondent reports years of education, in others the level of attainment in
(approximate) years of education. In a few cases, the variable is reported as “age at completed
education.” We code the original variables as three levels of education. They are based on the 7
categories defined by the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED, 1997). The
dummy LOW LEVEL refers to ISCED 0 (pre-primary), ISCED 1 (primary, between ages of four and
seven, lasts five or six years and is always compulsory) and ISCED 2 level (junior high school, often
corresponding to the end of compulsory schooling). The dummy MIDDLE LEVEL contains various
types of secondary education corresponding to ISCED 3 (upper secondary education, which starts
around the age of 14 or 15 and refers to either general, technical or vocational education). The dummy
HIGH LEVEL corresponds to ISCED 5, 6 and 7 levels. It includes college degree or equivalent,
postgraduate university degree, and programs that do not lead to a university degree, but to higher
vocational education and training, following the successful completion of the upper secondary level.
We use the country tables in OECD (1990), describing number of years and age for each school level
in each country to recode education levels into the three dummy indicators.
COUPLE The variable is 1if the head has a spouse or a cohabiting steady partner.
SELF-OWNED OR RENTED HOUSING Details available for home ownership vary by country. Most
distinguish between owned and rented living quarters. We define the household as owner when the
survey gives sufficient information concerning the actual purchase of the house (privately or through
co-operatives, as in Sweden) or the occupation with a redemption agreement. It takes value zero in the
remaining cases of rented house, social or free housing.
OUTSTANDING MORTGAGE LOANS / GDP Mortgage loans refer to outstanding loans against mortgages
on residential property. The main source for European countries between 1986 and 1996 is the
European Mortgage Federation (1997), Table 14. For years before 1986 we impute a value for
mortgage loans based on the growth rate of the series between 1986 and 1990. For Canada the source
is the Statistics Flow of Funds Accounts. For the United States the source is the Federal Reserve
Statistical Release (Flow of Funds Accounts). For Australia the source is the Bank of Australia
Bulletin. Annual GDP is drawn from IMF Financial Statistics.
DOWN PAYMENT RATIO We update the dataset of Jappelli and Pagano (1994) to the 1990s using data
from McLennan, Muellbauer and Stephens (1999), Lea and Diamond (1992), and Lea, Welter and
Dubel (1997). Even though the down payment might have changed during a decade, where possible
we take the average of the minimum ratios. We generally refer to conventional loans without mortgage
insurance, government guarantees or subsidies. In some countries there is no statutory minimum down
payment and payment arrangements are at the discretion of the individual lender. In that case we
assumed that the minimum is equal to the minimum observed average down payment ratio in the
decade.22
TABLE 1
HOUSING FINANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON
The interest rate spread is the average interest rate on mortgage loans less a long-term reference rate. Source:
European Mortgage Federation (1997), Table 21. Long-term interest rates are drawn from OECD (1996). Data
refer to 1986-96, except for Finland and Sweden (1990-96), Luxembourg (1986-87) and Spain (1993-96).
Outstanding mortgage loans over GDP are 1986-96 averages. Annual GDP is drawn from IMF Financial
Statistics. Mortgage maturity is drawn from Lea et al. (1997) and refers to 1990. The down payment ratios are
average values for three decades (1971-80, 1981-90, and 1991-97). See Appendix for sources on mortgage loans










Australia 19.30 -.- -.- 30 20 20
Austria 4.24 1.52 20-30 40 40 20
Belgium 20.08 1.02 15-20 35 25 20
Canada 41.32 -.- 30 25 25 20
Finland 32.35 1.23 10-15 20 15 20
France 22.02 0.95 15-20 20 20 20
Germany 28.92 1.10 25-30 35 35 20
Italy 5.49 1.47 15 50 44 40
Luxembourg 25.61 -1.02 15-20 40 40 40
Netherlands 43.29 0.41 30 25 25 25
Spain 15.01 -2.30 15-20 40 20 20
Sweden 56.50 0.20 20-30 10 5 25
United Kingdom 51.87 1.08 25 19 13 5
United States 43.61 1.60 30 20 11 2023
TABLE 2
EFFICIENCY OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND COSTS AND DURATION OF MORTGAGE
FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON
The table reports indicators of the efficiency of the judicial system, measurement of enforcement costs and an
indicator of law-and-order tradition. Efficiency of the judicial system is an assessment of the integrity of the
legal environment as it affects business taken from the country-risk agency Business International Corporation. It
is an average of 1980-83 and the scale is 0 to 10, with lower scores indicating lower efficiency. Source: La Porta
et al. (1997). Rule of law is an index assessing the law-and-order tradition in the country. It is an average of the
1982-95 period. The scale is 0 to 10 with lower scores for less tradition of law and order. Source: La Porta et al.
(1997). Legal expenses as percent of the price of the mortgaged house and duration of mortgage foreclosure
proceedings refer to 1990 and are drawn from European Mortgage Federation (1996). Data for duration in












Australia 10 10 -.- -.-
Austria 9.5 10 13 -.-
Belgium 9.5 10 24 16-23
Canada 9.25 10 4.75 -.-
Finland 10 10 -.- -.-
France 8 8.98 10-12 12-18
Germany 9 9.23 12-18 6
Italy 6.75 8.33 36-60 18-20
Luxembourg -.- -- 12 2
Netherlands 10 10 2-3 11
Spain 6.25 7.80 36 5-15
Sweden 10 10 -.- -.-
United Kingdom 10 8.57 12 4.75
United States 10 10 9 -.-24
TABLE 3
THE INTERNATIONAL DATASET
Country Data sources and years available Number of
observations
(percent)
Australia Australian Income and Housing Survey: 1981, 1985, 1989, 1994 48,783
(12.00)
Austria Austrian Microcensus: 1987 10,510
(2.58)
Belgium Panel Survey of the Centre for Social Policy: 1985, 1988, 1992 13,541
(3.33)
Canada Survey of Consumer Finances: 1975, 1981, 1987, 1991 75,312
(18.52)
Finland Income Distribution Survey: 1987, 1991 23,114
(5.68)
France Family Budget Survey: 1984, 1989, 1994 31,019
(7.63)
Germany German Socio Economic Panel Study: 1984, 1989, 1994 14,931
(3.67)




Luxembourg The Luxembourg Social Economic Panel Study: 1985 2,002
(0.49)
Netherlands Additional Enquiry on the Use of Public Services: 1983, 1987. Socio-
Economic Panel: 1991, 1994
17,631
(4.34)
Spain Expenditure and Income Survey: 1980, 1990 43,952
(10.81)
Sweden Income Distribution Survey: 1992, 1995 27,255
(6.70)
UK The Family Expenditure Survey: 1986, 1991, 1995 20,067
(4.93)
US March Current Population Survey: 1974, 1979, 1986, 1991 55,036
(13.53)
All countries 39 surveys 406,64625
TABLE 4
AVERAGE HOUSEHOLD SIZE
Country Year Household size Country Year Household size
Australia 1981 2.70 Italy 1986 3.16
1985 2.57 1991 3.09
1989 2.55 1995 3.00
1994 2.48
Austria 1987 2.28 Luxembourg 1985 3.03
Belgium 1985 2.87 Netherlands 1983 2.77
1988 3.00 1987 2.59
1992 2.87 1991 2.50
1994 2.54
Canada 1975 3.03 Spain 1980 3.73
1981 2.98 1990 3.46
1987 2.77
1991 2.56
Finland 1987 2.87 Sweden 1992 2.27
1991 2.75 1995 2.17
France 1984 2.82 UK 1986 2.60
1989 2.77 1991 2.47
1994 2.65 1995 2.49
Germany 1984 2.78 US 1974 2.90
1989 2.70 1979 2.67
1994 2.64 1986 2.62
1991 2.6026
TABLE 5
SAMPLE COMPOSITION BY AGE
The table reports the proportion of household heads in each age bracket. The statistics are computed using
sample weights. Country values are aggregated over different years. The Appendix reports the definition of the
household head in each survey.
Country 25-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-79
Australia 10.69 23.34 22.92 15.69 13.14 14.21
Austria 10.03 20.06 17.68 14.58 18.91 18.74
Belgium 10.01 23.20 19.19 17.86 17.44 12.31
Canada 12.90 25.38 19.46 16.09 13.76 12.40
Finland 11.63 24.02 22.25 16.30 14.71 11.09
France 9.15 23.24 20.18 17.56 16.51 13.36
Germany 8.91 19.30 18.38 19.51 18.45 15.44
Italy 4.16 18.73 21.63 22.68 19.31 13.50
Luxembourg 8.60 22.59 21.33 19.50 13.94 14.04
Netherlands 10.80 25.06 20.31 14.96 15.69 13.18
Spain 5.39 19.63 21.99 22.32 18.71 11.95
Sweden 11.71 20.11 21.01 16.79 14.46 15.92
United Kingdom 10.02 21.84 20.11 16.29 16.80 14.94
United States 12.83 24.57 19.64 16.67 14.95 11.3327
TABLE 6
HOME OWNERSHIP BY THE AGE OF THE HOUSEHOLD HEAD
The table reports the proportion of home owners in each age bracket. Statistics are computed using sample
weights. Country values are aggregated over different years.
Country 25-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-79 Average
Australia 33.74 60.27 75.46 82.37 81.69 79.98 70.06
Austria 23.46 43.49 48.63 52.62 52.22 37.88 44.32
Belgium 31.98 59.36 71.76 75.18 73.65 69.82 65.58
Canada 35.93 59.46 73.33 73.75 70.28 58.65 62.81
Finland 43.61 67.70 79.43 81.33 79.39 74.34 72.19
France 20.36 47.03 63.06 66.90 68.83 63.37 57.10
Germany 11.39 33.28 45.36 54.03 56.71 39.01 42.81
Italy 31.42 47.88 65.55 69.96 71.23 65.74 62.91
Luxembourg 39.71 54.18 71.35 75.89 81.66 67.94 66.60
Netherlands 33.50 55.16 61.65 55.78 38.92 24.00 47.57
Spain 48.10 67.57 76.53 78.66 79.81 76.55 74.33
Sweden 32.36 49.91 60.49 64.40 59.80 52.94 54.42
United Kingdom 59.05 70.62 76.30 74.99 66.40 56.92 68.56
United States 37.70 59.53 73.42 78.00 78.84 74.80 67.1528
TABLE 7
GROUPED DATA REGRESSIONS
The table reports grouped data regressions for the probability of owning the house of residence. The number of





































































































































Country Effects YES YES YES YES
Time Effects YES NO YES NO
R squared 0.83 0.82 0.79 0.7829
FIGURE 1
INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES HOME OWNERSHIP PROFILES
The figure reports age profiles of home ownership in the 14 countries surveyed. Each profile is obtained by the
fitted values of a probit regression of home ownership on a third-order age polynomial. Surveys in each country
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FIGURE 2
MORTGAGE LOANS, JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY
AND DURATION OF MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS
The figures plot the 1986-96 average of outstanding mortgage loans as a percentage of GDP against judicial
efficiency and duration of mortgage foreclosure proceedings. Data and sources and definitions are reported in
Tables 1 and 2.
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 Mortgages/GDP






































DOWN PAYMENT RATIO, JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY AND LENGTH OF MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE
The figures plot the average down payment ratio against respectively judicial efficiency and length of mortgage
foreclosure. The down payment ratio is averaged over all years. Data and sources and definitions are reported in
Tables 1 and 2.
Judicial efficiency
 Down payment ratio
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AGE PROFILES OF HOME OWNERSHIP FOR VARIOUS MORTGAGE/GDP RATIOS:
REGRESSION WITH TIME EFFECTS
The figure plots the age profile of home ownership. The profile is based on regression 1 of Table 7. Except for
the ratio of outstanding mortgages to GDP, the predicted values of the regression are evaluated at the sample
mean of each of the explanatory variables.
Age of household head
 Mortgages/GDP=5%  Mortgages/GDP=20%
 Mortgages/GDP=50%











AGE PROFILES OF HOME OWNERSHIP FOR VARIOUS DOWN PAYMENT RATIOS:
REGRESSION WITH TIME EFFECTS
The figure plots the age profile of home ownership. The profile is based on the regression reported in column 3
of Table 7. Except for the down payment ratio, the predicted values of the regression are evaluated at the sample
mean of each of the explanatory variables.
Age of household head
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